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This study sets out to develop a simplified risk premium model to explain output decline 
within the economies of Asia in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. Firms 
are allowed to borrow from both domestic and foreign banks, with the firms’ debts being 
loosely constrained (at high levels) prior to the crisis (lending boom) but becoming tightly 
constrained (at low levels) on the outbreak of the crisis (lending bust).   
The lending rate is a function of the debt-capital ratio; thus if firms have only limited 
access to the credit market, then they will accumulate less capital and become small firms. 
Given their lower collateral, small firms face higher risk premiums which will ultimately 
lead to a much greater reduction in output when a credit crunch suddenly hits. Our model 
predicts that small firm size will accelerate unanticipated shocks; therefore, output decline 
will be greater in countries with small firms than in those with large firms. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
For most of the Asian economies, the eruption of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
was nothing short of a nightmare, and despite the extensive research into the causes and 
effects of the crisis, some of the worst affected countries have yet to fully recover. 
Indeed, an examination of these worst affected countries reveals that there is 
considerable variation in the real-side response to the shock, from around -10 per cent to 
-20 per cent.
1 It therefore seems crucial to determine the underlying differences between 
these countries that could possibly lead to such variations in their response to the crisis. 
 
∗ We are thankful for the comments and suggestions provided by Carlos Vegh, Amartya Lahiri and Luisa 
Lambertini. We would especially like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Any errors are 
our responsibility. 
1 The real-side response is measured by the growth rate of the manufacturing production index (MPI). 
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The Asian financial crisis was preceded by a significant lending boom that 
subsequently came to a very abrupt end; the availability of bank loans dried up almost 
instantaneously, leading to a reduction in the level of capital available for production, 
and therefore, a general fall in production output. Following the initial breakout of the 
crisis in Thailand, the contagion had spread rapidly across the whole of Asia resulting in 
unprecedented economic depression; with stock prices falling dramatically between 
1997 and 1998, there was considerable shrinkage in firms’ overall asset values. An 
illustration of the stock price index for four most affected Asian countries,
2 Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, is provided in Figure 1. 
Given their diverse economic backgrounds, and their very distinct government 
policies, the size of firms varies considerably across these countries. In Korea, for 
example, there are many examples of gigantic manufacturing enterprises (chaebols), 
whereas in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the economy is still heavily reliant upon 
small family-owned manufacturing firms. Large firms, with their greater asset value, can 
gain access to better credit terms to smooth over the shocks whilst small firms have very 







































Figure 1.    Stock Price Index of Selected Asian Countries: January 1990 ~ January 2001 
 
2 See “External Shocks, Financial Crises and Poverty in Developing Countries” in World Bank Report on 
Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries (2000). THE ROLE OF FIRM SIZE IN CONTROLLING OUTPUT DECLINE  105
There are essentially two mainstream theories that attempt to explain output changes 
from a financial market perspective. The first approach concentrates on the 
imperfectness of the credit market (credit constraints) to explain output changes. 
Kiyotaki and Moor (1997), for example, developed a model where firms’ borrowing was 
restricted to the value of their collateral; when the value of collateral falls, the firms’ 
borrowing becomes more constrained, thus causing a reduction in the capital available 
for production, and hence, a decline in output.   
The second approach, generally referred to as the ‘financial accelerator theory’, 
concerns risk premiums. Under this approach, Bernanke, et al. (2000) demonstrated that 
firms are faced with a risk premium which is essentially a function of their debt-capital 
ratio. When firms are faced with a monetary shock, there is a corresponding decline in 
both their production level and their net worth, leading to an increase in risk premiums 
which saddles them with more debt and leads to a further reduction in output. Thus, 
firms with higher risk premiums have higher output decline. 
The model adopted for this study is a simplified risk premium model where firms’ 
debts are loosely constrained (at high levels) prior to the crisis (lending boom) but 
become tightly constrained (at low levels) during the period of the crisis (lending bust).   
Firm size plays an important role in determining the magnitude of output changes; 
indeed manufacturing firms’ responses to aggregate fluctuations have been shown to be 
related to firm size, since small firms have greater difficulty in securing access to 
short-term financing during a period of recession (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). 
Bernanke, et al. (1996) examined the relationship between firm size and the business 
cycle to solve the ‘small shock, large cycle’ puzzle; their central theme was that small 
firms tend to behave as an accelerator which actually amplifies the shock. Hsu (2003) 
focused on data in Asian countries and found out that firm sizes have deterministic 
effects on domestic output changes. 
Oliner and Rudebush (1993) demonstrated that investments are cut back relatively 
quicker in small firms than large firms when there is a reduction in cash flow. In this 
paper, as opposed to studying the impacts of monetary policy, we focus on a lending 
‘boom and bust’ scenario during the period of the Asian financial crisis, and construct a 
simple, small open economy to explain the effects of firm size on output decline. The 
basic mechanism within this small economy involves large and small firms facing 
different lending rates, and collateral playing a major role in determining the interest rate 
applied to the loans.   
Chang and Velasco (1998) assumed that the risk premium attached to interest rates 
was a function of collateral, whilst Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2000, 2001) used 
international and domestic collateral to explain a sharp rise in interest rates. 
Auernheimer and Garcia-Saltos (1999) examined a small open economy in which the 
borrowing interest rate depended upon the value of assets as implicit collateral, whilst 
Aizenman (1989) and Agenor (1997) also incorporated the idea of total debt as a 
determinant of the interest rates faced by domestic borrowers.   
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lending rate being a function of the debt-capital ratio. In addition to their borrowing 
from domestic banks, we also allow firms to borrow from foreign banks. If firms have 
only limited access to the credit market (higher credit constraints), then they will have 
lower levels of bank financing and will therefore accumulate less capital, thus, they will 
ultimately become small firms. Given their lower collateral, small firms face higher risk 
premiums which ultimately lead to a much greater reduction in output when a credit 
crunch suddenly occurs. Our model predicts that small firm size will accelerate 
unanticipated shocks; therefore, output decline is greater in countries with small firms 
than in those with large firms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present 
some stylized facts in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, followed in the 
subsequent section by presentation of the model adopted in this study. Thereafter, we 
examine the impact on output stemming from fundamental shocks. Shock contagion is 
introduced into the model in the penultimate section, followed, in the final section, by 
the conclusions drawn from this study. 
 
 
2.  SOME  STYLIZED  FACTS 
 
Prior to our construction of the model, we examine some of the stylized facts on firm 
size and output within the manufacturing sector for four countries, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand. These countries are selected, based not only on our focus on the 
countries that were worst affected by the Asian financial crisis, but also on the fact that 
they were experiencing lending booms prior to the onset of the crisis, as regards their 
extremely high corporate debt-to-equity ratios (4:1 in Thailand, over 5:1 in Korea and 
even higher for Indonesia).
3  
Our data demonstrates that the larger the size of the firm, the smaller fall in 
production output, and if we compare bank lending to the private sector in Korea with 
similar bank lending in the other three countries, we find that greater accessibility to the 
credit market can help to smooth out the reduction in output. 
 
2.1.  Firm  Size 
 
In an effort to provide a better understanding of the distribution of firm size in Asia, 
we list the 1997 value of firm assets for the four countries in Table 1. As the table shows, 
average firm assets were the largest in Korea, at US$422.78 million, followed by 
Malaysia with US$394.03 million, Thailand with US$317.55 million, and Indonesia 
with the smallest average level of firm assets, at US$263.01 million. 
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Table 1.    Distribution of Asset Value (US$ millions) in Manufacturing Firms 1997 
Country Obs. Mean  Std.  Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Korea 772  422.78  1710.98 8.81  99.38  0.22  25667.12 
Malaysia 134 394.03  681.52 3.98 21.06 1.65  4744.19 
Thailand 139 317.55  750.48  5.41 36.53  12.12  6244 
Indonesia 120  263.01  593.23 5.29 36.29 7.15  4807.03 
Source: Hyundai Securities, KLSE, JSX, SET and Taiwan Securities. 
 
 
If the sample focuses on the top ten companies in each country, we still find that 
Korea has the largest firm assets. Figure 2 provides details of the asset values of the top 
ten firms in several countries for comparison. In order to remove the scale effect, we 
divide the total asset value of the top ten firms by GDP and present the results in Figure 
3; the ranking is, nevertheless, the same. Korean firms still have the greater asset-GDP 
ratio (0.54), followed by Malaysia (0.49), Thailand (0.27) and Indonesia with the 
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Note: 1992 ERM crisis, and 1997 Asian financial crisis.   
Source: TWTC trade report (1996). 
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Note: 1992 ERM crisis, and 1997 Asian financial crisis.   
Source: TWTC trade report (1996). 
 
Figure 3.    Total Asset Values to GDP of the Top Ten Firms 
 
 
The growth of most firms in Asia depends on external financing (bank loans) 
which may also help to explain the variation in firm size; we therefore present 
details of bank lending to the private sector for the four Asian countries under 
examination in Table 2.   
Korean firms have better access to the credit market because they are able to 
borrow funds from banks owned by the same chaebol to which they belong.
4 From 
1993 to 1997, the aggregate bank lending to the private sector in Korea was around 
two to three times greater than in Malaysia, Indonesia or Thailand. Such easier 
access to bank loans enables the firms in Korea to grow faster, and thus leads to a 











4 Note that chaebol does not own any commercial banks. However, they have financial institutes such as 
merchant banks, security companies and insurance companies. We thank the referee for reminding us this. THE ROLE OF FIRM SIZE IN CONTROLLING OUTPUT DECLINE  109
Table 2.    Selected Bank Loan Terms for Corporations/SMEs   
Country/ 
Bank 
Lending Rate and 
Calculation 




The cost of ADB’s 
fixed rate borrowing 
of US$, Japanese 
yen, or Swiss francs 
at the time of each 







land, buildings or the 
project itself. 
An additional repayment premium 
may be charged on the basis of 
present value of the difference 
between the interest rates 
prevailing at the time of the 
original loan pricing and those 
prevailing at the time of repayment 
or cancellation. 
Maturity is up to 15 years, 
including a suitable grace period. 
Longer maturities may be 
considered depending on 





The aggregate of 
LIBOR for that 









The interest period applicable to 
the loan is six months. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the 
borrower repays to the lender the 
principal amount of the loan in one 
lump sum, together with all 
accrued interest and any other 




Ringgit loans are at 
the bank’s cost of 
funds plus a spread. 
Other currencies are 
based on SIBOR/ 
LIBOR plus a 
margin.  
Liquid assets 
Maturity is a maximum of 10 years 
including a grace period not 
exceeding 2 years.   






or minimum lending 
rate, plus interest 
rate spread 
Land, buildings and 
equipment 
Loans up to a maximum of Baht 10 
million ($270,000) in the case of 
private sector borrowers. 






Fixed interest rate, 
plus margin 
Fixed assets, current 
assets and cash flow 
Maximum borrowing period is one 
year. If there is still work 
remaining on the project after one 
year, loans can be extended 
accordingly. 
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2.2.    Output in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
With the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis, all four countries experienced declining 
output. The production growth rates in the manufacturing sectors of the four countries are 
provided in Figure 4.
5 As the figure shows, there was a severe decline in production in 
1998, with the maximum decrease being in Indonesia (23 per cent), followed by Thailand 
(15.8 per cent), Malaysia (10.9 per cent) and Korea (9.5 per cent). Production in Thailand 
and Indonesia fell by between 1.5 and 2.4 times as much as in Korea. Most importantly, if 
we compare firm size and the production response for each country, we find that the 















Figure 4.    Annual Growth Rate of Manufacturing Production Index (MPI)   
in Selected Asian Countries 
 
 
Figure 5 combines the data on MPI growth rate (from Figure 4) with the data on firm 
size (from Table 1). As the figure clearly illustrates, Korea has the largest average firm 
size, but the smallest decline in manufacturing production output, whereas in contrast, 
Indonesia has the smallest firm size and the greatest decline in GDP, supporting our 
proposition that the greater the firm size, the lower the reduction in output. 
 
 




















Average Asset Value of
Manufacturing Firms (US$
Million.)
Rate of Decline in the MPI
in 1998
Source: TWTC Trade Report, and IFS 2000. 
 
Figure 5.    Firm Size and Post-Crisis Production Response   
 
 
2.3.  Linkage  between  Non-Availability of Loans and Output Decline 
 
We now turn to an examination of the relationship between accessibility to the credit 
market and firm size noting that firms in Asia rely heavily on bank loans. Figure 6 provides 
firm level data for 1997 on the composition of firms’ total liabilities. In the US, equity 
comprised of up to 50 per cent of liabilities whilst bank loans accounted for around 25 per 
cent; however, the situation in Asia is totally different. Equity comprised of only 5 per cent 
of liabilities in Thailand, 7 per cent in South Korea, 8 per cent in Indonesia and 16 per cent in 
Malaysia, whilst bank loans were much higher, accounting for up to 87 per cent of liabilities 
in Thailand, 77 per cent in Korea, 76 per cent in Indonesia, and 55 per cent in Malaysia. 
A loan agreement usually comprises of the principal (the sum borrowed), the 
maturity period (short-term or long-term loan) and the pricing method (fixed or floating 
lending rate); a floating lending rate may be ‘prime-plus’ or ‘times-prime’.
6 Credit 
analysis is often undertaken prior to making the loan decision and one of the factors 
considered in the credit analysis is debt-capital ratio, which works as an indicator of a 
firm’s repayment ability. Table 2 shows how banks decide the lending spread; the lower 
the debt-capital ratio, the higher the credit rating and the lower the price of the loan. 
 
6 Prime-plus means that the lending rate is equal to a prime rate “plus” a spread. Times-prime means the 
lending rate is the prime rate multiplied by a number. HUNG-JU CHEN AND HSIAO-TANG HSU  112
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Source: Bank for International Settlement, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), International Federation of Stock Exchange (FIBV); and World Bank. 
 
Figure 6.    Composition of Firm’s Total Liabilities 1997 
 
 
Firms are, however, required to provide collateral if they wish to borrow, with 
examples of collateral being accounts receivable, equipment, machinery, real estate 
and inventory; the higher the value of the collateral, the more the banks will lend to 
a firm.
7 Figure 7 shows the loan availability and output reduction rate, confirming, 
in the case of Korea for example, that firms’ production output is less volatile where 
there is greater bank loan availability.
8
 
7 See Greenbaum and Thakor (1995). 
8 We consider only firms’ lending from domestic banks since this was the main source of borrowing once 
foreign investors withdrew during the Asian financial crisis. Domestic bank lending to the private sector in 
1997 was US$308.95 billion in Korea, US$102.61 billion in Malaysia, US$180.73 billion in Thailand and 
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Source: EIU, IFS and author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 7.    Bank Lending and Output Decline 
 
 
2.4.    Financial Aid from the IMF 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand each received 
financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as shown in Table 3, 
with IMF programs being put in place between 1997 and 1998 in order to restore 
economic confidence and rebuild the economies of these countries. According to the 
IMF’s annual report (1998), the equivalent of US$35 billion was provided for economic 
reforms in these countries in 1997, with a further US$77 billion in financial aid being 
provided from multilateral or bilateral resources.   
 
 
Table 3.    International Community Commitments and IMF Disbursements in Response   
to the Asian Financial Crisis 
a (US$ Billions) 
Country IMF  Multilateral 
b Bilateral Total 
Disbursement/ 
GDP (%) 
Indonesia 11.2  10.0  21.1
 c 42.3 13.0 
Korea 20.9  14.0  23.3
 c 58.2 6.0 
Thailand 4.0  2.7  10.5  17.2  4.0 
Total 36.1  26.7  54.9  117.7  - 
Notes: 
a) Figures are as at July 1998. 
b) Multilateral includes World Bank and Asian Development bank. 
c) Bilateral to Indonesia and Korea are a contingent second line of defense. 
Sources: IMF Annual report 1998, and IFS. 
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In the case of Indonesia, a further US$1 billion was approved by the IMF in mid 
1998, along with another US$5 billion in multilateral and bilateral aid. However, if we 
focus too much on the influence of IMF loans, we run the risk of missing the bigger 
picture. It is clear that both South Korea and Indonesia received significant international 
support following the crisis, yet Korea was able to rebound strongly and get its economy 
back on track at a much faster pace. There is therefore no discernible link between the 
financial assistance provided by the IMF and the economic recovery of the countries 
under examination; clearly, therefore, there are other factors that were important to the 
recovery of these countries. 
 
 
3.  THE  MODEL 
 
We assume a small open economy comprising of six economic sectors, households, 
firms, retailers, domestic banks, foreign banks and the government, with this economy 
possessing only one tradable good. Let   represent the real exchange rate and define 
  as the units of domestic good per unit of foreign good. We use   to  represent the 
depreciation/appreciation rate of  ; i.e.,  .  
t E
t E t ε






We assume that households own firms and banks and they consume and make 
deposits in the domestic banks. Their utility function is: 
 
dt t ct ) exp( log
0 ∫
∞
−β ,                                                   ( 1 )  
 
where   represents the consumption of goods and  t c β  is the subjective discount rate. 
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where   is the real interest rate paid on deposits;   represents deposits;   
denotes dividends from firms;    represents profits from domestic banks;  stands 
for profits from the foreign banks; and   is the lump-sum transfer from government 






















t r − = β ρ ρ ,                                                      ( 4 )  
 
where  ρ  is the multiplier associated with the inter-temporal budget constraint, 
(Equation (2)). Substituting out ρ  in Equation (4) with Equation (3), we get the 










Firms can borrow from the domestic banks or from the foreign banks. Note that 
when firms borrow from the foreign banks, their contracts are signed in terms of units of 
foreign good. We use   and    to represent firms’ borrowings from the domestic 
banks and from the foreign banks in terms of units of domestic good, respectively. The 













t d d d + = .                                                     ( 6 )  
 
We assume that firms can hold debt   and  equity  ; together, these are denoted 
as the capital stock of firms ( ): 
f





t t h d k + = .                                                        ( 7 )  
 
We assume that firms require intermediate goods to produce final goods; however, 
firms do not have intermediate goods of their own, but can readily obtain them from 
retailers. There are numerous identical retailers, each of which is endowed with 
entrepreneurial skills (the ability to produce intermediate goods using resources) and has 
one unit of labor.
9 By using his/her ‘skilled’ labor, a retailer can produce intermediate 
goods out of the capital stock offered by the firm. Each retailer has Leontif technology 
which is capable of producing one unit of intermediate goods out of one unit of labor 
and one unit of capital stock. Each retailer can ultimately produce exactly one unit of 
intermediate good for the firm and will be paid at a wage rate of  . The capital stock  t w
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does not depreciate and the firm accumulates new capital; hence, firms will offer all of 
their capital stock  , and pay   to retailers, in order to get   ( ) units of 
intermediate good. 
t k t tk w t I t k =
The production function of firms producing the final good is  , where 
α
t t AI Y = A is 
productivity and  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α . Firms reinvest new capital stock   from new debt 
(external financing) and equity accumulation    (internal financing). The difference 
between debt and equity is that debt repayment is deducted from the firm’s income tax.
t I
f
t d t h
10 
Given this advantage, the firm may wish to use 100 per cent debt; however, there are 
credit constraints for firms.
11 Banks lend no more than a benchmark plus a fraction of a 
firm’s assets; the benchmark (γ ) is an unsecured loan (i.e., no collateral is required), but 
this will depend on the firm’s established creditworthiness.   
If firms wish to borrow more than the benchmark, the banks will demand collateral 
in order to reduce the risk of default; firms’ assets can be regarded as collateral. These 
collateral loans are a fraction (λ ) of the firms’ assets; hence, the collateral loans to firms 
from the domestic and foreign banks are  ,  t ik λ f d i , = , where  1 0 < < λ ,   
represents the domestic banks and   represents the foreign banks. The variable   
measures how much access firms have to the credit market. Therefore, the firm’s debt 
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t k d λ γ + ≤ .                                                       ( 9 )  
 
We assume that the credit constraints are always binding, thus ensuring that firms 
use both debt and equity. We use   and   to represent the loan interest rates of 
the domestic and foreign banks, respectively. According to the ‘no arbitrage’ condition, 
















r r ε + = .                                                     ( 1 0 )  
 
Differentiating Equation (7) with respect to the time, we can obtain: 
 
10 This is known as the ‘tax shielding’ effect. 
11 Aghion, et al. (2001) presented a model where currency crisis is driven by the interaction between credit 
constraints and nominal price rigidity. THE ROLE OF FIRM SIZE IN CONTROLLING OUTPUT DECLINE  117
. . . . .
t t t
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Internal financing   is defined as the post-tax revenue net of debt repayment and 
wage payment, minus dividends:   
t h
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Ω − − − − − − =
τ
ε τ
                     ( 1 2 )  
 
where  τ  is the corporate income tax rate in the manufacturing sector and   are the 
dividends from the firm distributed to households.   
f
t Ω
Firms maximize their value,  , which is defined by Modigliani-Miller as the sum 
of the discounted cash flows of the shareholder and the cash flow of the debt holder: 
V
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After collection of the terms, we obtain the firms’ maximization problem as: 
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The optimal choice for firms is therefore: 
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This section completes our discussion on retailing. We assume that retailers are 
identical and that a perfect competition market exists for all retailers, who are free to 
enter or exit the market. The number of retailers is determined by the demand for 
intermediate goods. The more intermediate goods that are required, the more retailers 
there are in the market. Each retailer earns a wage which it spends on consumption 
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where    is the consumption for a retailer,  . 
r
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Wages are determined by the firms’ optimal condition and hence are exogenous to 
the retailer, and each retailer consumes its total wage. Since   retailers are hired for 
the intermediate good, there will be, on aggregate,   units of final good consumed 












Domestic banks take deposits from households which they use to makes loans to 





t t d d a
d
− = .                                                      ( 1 7 )  
 
The flow constraint for the domestic banks is: 
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In a world filled with the problem of moral hazard, domestic banks base their 
lending rates on firms’ ability to repay (risk premium), with this repayment ability being 
measured by the firm’s total debt-capital ratio (following Bernanke et al. (2000)). The 
loan interest rate charged by the domestic banks is equal to the base rate (
* r ) plus the 
risk premium. We assume that the base rate is determined by the government, i.e.,: 
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Equation (20) shows that the risk premium for non-collateral loans is 
t k
γ
, whilst the 




Without loss of generality, we assume that households do not place deposits into the 
foreign banks;
12 therefore, the flow constraint of the foreign banks is: 
 







t d r d Ω − =
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The government collects taxes from the firm and returns the tax revenue to 
households as lump-sum transfers. We assume that the government runs a balanced 
budget with the government’s budget constraint being: 
 




t t k w d r Y
d
Π = − − τ                                             ( 2 2 )  
 
Economic Resource Constraint 
 
Combining Equations (2), (7), (11), (12), (17), (18), (19), (21) and (22), we can 
determine the flow constraint of the economy in equilibrium: 
 
r
t t t t c c Y k − − =
.
.                                                     ( 2 3 )  
 
The Dynamic System 
 
We now aim to build up a dynamic system in   and  . From Equations (5), (19) 
and (20), we can obtain the differential equation of  , which is: 




12 Allowing households to place deposits into the foreign banks merely complicates the model without 
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From Equations (16) and (23), we obtain the differential equation of  , which is:  t k
 




















r k A w . 
 
So we can rewrite the transition of   as:  t k
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Equations (24) and (25) constitute a two-differential equation dynamic system in   
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J ,          ( 2 9 )  
 
where   is the Jacobian matrix of the differential system; the determinant of the 
Jacobian matrix is: 
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hence; the system contains one positive root and one negative root and exhibits a saddle 
path.




0 = t k &
0 = t c &
t c t c
Figure 8.  Phase  Diagram 
 
 
4.  FUNDAMENTAL  SHOCKS 
 
In this section, we study the reaction of an economy when a lending bust is followed 
by a temporary or permanent credit crunch. We assume that with the same assets, firms 
can get higher collateral loans during the lending boom, but that these collateral loans 
will shrink during the subsequent lending bust (tightening credit constraints). That is,  λ  
is high during a lending boom, and declines during a lending bust. 
In order to analyze the impacts of firm size on output decline during a financial crisis, 
we first need to distinguish between small and large firms. 
 
4.1.    Definition of Firm Size 
 
The size of a firm is measured by the steady-state value of its capital,  . The 
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ss  ,  f d i , = , 
 
hence; given  β , 
* r  and λ , the steady-state value of capital ( ) is an increasing 
function of  ,  . Intuitively, better credit will allow better access to unsecured 
loans, which will in turn help firms to accumulate more capital and produce greater 
output. Hence, those firms belonging to the same chaebol as the banks in Korea (high 
) can secure higher bank lending to accumulate more capital and become large firms.   
ss k
i γ f d i , =
d γ
The fundamental shock during a financial crisis is referred to as a credit crunch 
because of the inherent weakness of the banking system, which is represented in the 
model by a decrease in  . We assume that   decreases from   to  . Note that 
a decrease in    will lower the value of 





d λ λ . This decrease causes firms to change their 
debt-to-equity composition and leads to a fall in capital/output. We define   as the 












This implies that a decrease (increase) in    will decrease (increase) the 
steady-state value of output. 
d λ










































.                            ( 3 0 )  
 
Equation (30) shows that the decrease in output is smaller for firms that are large in 
size, and vice versa. Credit risk is more costly for financially stressed firms with fewer 
assets as collateral, and this cost reflects on borrowing const which directly affects 
firms’ net income and investment ability. This will cause a larger reduction in output for 
small firms. This result is outlined in proposition 1.   
 
Proposition 1 When a shock of tightening credit constraints occurs, there will be a 
greater decline in output in countries with small firms. 
 
4.2.  Unanticipated  and  Permanent Lending Bust   
 
We first assume that the decrease in   in period   is both unanticipated and 
permanent. 
d λ 1 T




















d λ λ >
 
Since output is a monotonic increasing function of  , output behavior can be 
studied by the dynamics of capital. Figure 9 shows the transitions of capital and 
consumption for two countries with different firm sizes when there is a permanent 
decrease in 
ss k
λ . We use points A and E to represent the countries with large and small 
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Figure 9.  Permanent  Shock  on λ  
 
 
With a decrease in  λ , the curve representing   will shift to the left whilst the 
curve representing   will rotate clockwise. There will be a smaller percentage 
change in output/capital for those countries with large firms, as Proposition 1 suggests. 
When a credit crunch occurs, the system will jump from point A to point B and will then 







14 However, there will be a larger percentage change in 
output/capital for those countries with small firms; therefore, when a fundamental shock 
 
14 Note that depending on parameter values, point B could be above or below point A because the new saddle 
path could be above or below the original saddle path; however, this will only affect the transition in 
consumption and will not affect the transition in capital/output. HUNG-JU CHEN AND HSIAO-TANG HSU  124
occurs, the system will jump from E to F and then converge at G.
15  
 
4.3.  Temporary  Lending  Bust  
 
We now turn to an analysis of output decline when the shock of credit constraints is 
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Figure 10 illustrates the transitions in both capital and consumption. For those 
countries with large firms, the system jumps from point A to point B and then, with the 
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Figure 10.  Temporary  Shock  on λ  
 
 
Since the shock is only temporary, starting from period  , the system will jump to 
point C and then move back along the original saddle path to converge at point A. 
However, for those countries with small firms, the system jumps from point E to point F 
in period    and then follows the new dynamic path. In period  , 
2 T
1 T 2 T λ   goes back to its 
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original level and the system will jump to point G before converging at point E. These 
two paths are identical, but since they start from different levels of capital, the 
percentage change in capital (and output) is different. Proposition 2 summarizes these 
results. 
 
Proposition 2 When there is a temporary credit crunch, output decline will be 
amplified by a reduction in firm size. 
 
Proposition 2 explains why we observe a greater reduction in output in Indonesia 
than in Korea; during a financial crisis, tightened credit constraints lead to small firms 
suffering more than large firms, which in turn, leads to a greater reduction in output. 
 
 
5.    SHOCK CONTAGION AND INTEREST RATE POLICY 
 
Given the severity of the trade competition with other Asian countries, in November 
1997, the Korean government allowed the Won to depreciate by 25 per cent.
16 In this 
section, we analyze the impact on production output stemming from shock contagion 
and examine those areas where a government should be prepared to intervene when the 
economy is hit by financial crisis. 
 
Shock Contagion   
 
We have shown, in Equation (8), that the credit constraints placed upon a firm 
depend on the firm’s creditworthiness. Given that devaluation of   (that is, an 
increase in  ) will increase a firm’s foreign debt burden, the foreign banks will lower 
their credit limits based on the fear of an increase in default risk. Hence, the ability of 
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Looking at the transition in capital, note that when the magnitude of the increase in 
 is  unanticipated,  the curve representing    will shift to the left, whilst the curve 
representing   will descend. Figure 11 shows the transition in   and   where 
the shock is temporary in nature. The system will jump from point A to point B and then 
move to point C before returning to point A. If the shock contagion causes fundamental 











16 Corsetti, et al. (1999) argued that this dramatic fall in the local currency led to an increase in Korea’s 
foreign debt burden and a worsening of the effects of the financial crisis on the domestic economy. HUNG-JU CHEN AND HSIAO-TANG HSU  126
even further to the left, whilst the curve representing   will rotate clockwise. The 
system will jump to point D, and then move to point E where the capital level is even 
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Figure 11.  Temporary  Shock  on γ  
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we present a simple, small open economy to facilitate a study of the 
impact of firm size on production output following the outbreak of the Asian financial 
crisis. Stylized facts are provided on Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand which 
show that firms that are smaller in size experienced a greater reduction in production 
output. The main distinction between the credit markets in Korea and those in other 
countries is that Korean chaebols actually own banks, which clearly makes it much 
easier for those firms within the same chaebol to secure loans. Greater accessibility to 
financing allows firms to maintain their production output levels and thereby become 
larger. Since small firms have less collateral available to them, they suffer from greater 
variations in risk premiums when there is a tightening of credit constraints, thus leading 
to a greater fall in production output. Output decline is therefore greater in small firms 
than in large firms. 
The implications of these results are that the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia THE ROLE OF FIRM SIZE IN CONTROLLING OUTPUT DECLINE  127
and Thailand should consider helping their small, loosely organized family businesses to 
evolve into larger and more formally organized companies. On their way towards 
growth, these firms can gain better financial discipline, as well as greater accountability 





The Dynamic System of the Model 
 
The dynamic system is constituted by Equations (24) and (25). By setting   in 








= = * r
k k ss t .                                                ( A 1 )  
 
Equation (A1) is presented as the line   in Figure 1. Setting   in 
Equation (25), we derive: 
0
.


















α .                         ( A 2 )  
 
Equation (A2) is presented as the line   in Figure 1. The Jacobian matrix of 
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. Hence, the system 
contains one positive root and one negative root and exhibits a saddle path.   
Note that when  γ  decreases, the line representing   will shift to the left and 






= t k λ  decreases, the line representing 
  will shift to the left and the curve representing    will rotate clockwise.  0
.
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